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Teaching materials in public law courses typically rely almost wholly on judicial opinions 
as their primary materials, amplifi ed by selections from the secondary literature. Constitutional 
text may appear independently, but statutory text rarely does, and the materials of the legislative 
process are generally absent. In administrative law course books, administrative opinions and the 
materials of rulemaking rarely if ever appear. Yet these are primary materials with which lawyers 
must deal with increasing frequency. Lawyers encounter statutes, rules, administrative policies, 
and administrative disputes without judicial guidance, looking forward and not backward in 
time. The growth of courses in legislation and the regulatory state off ers a chance for change from 
limitations owing much to Christopher Columbus Langdell’s insistence that only judicial opinions 
provided the appropriate raw material for law study. A review of the materials developed for the 
course reveals only a few departures from this aged and, in the author’s judgment, impoverished 
and fundamentally misleading pattern.

When asked to write a contribution to a festschrift celebrating Professor Jerry 
Mashaw’s life of extraordinary administrative law scholarship, I was struck 
by the sharp distinction he has long drawn between internal and external 
administrative law—between those contributions to the regularity and legality 
of agency behavior that emerge from its own institutions and practices, and the 
constraints imposed by external actors, legislative, executive, and judicial. The 
“systems of internal control and audit” he found common to nineteenth-century 
governance in his magisterial account of early American administrative law1 
are subordinated, if not suppressed, in today’s thinking about administrative 
1. CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 313 (2012).
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law. “In our world of multiple transsubstantive statutes and ubiquitous 
judicial review, we tend to think of our administrative constitution as a set 
of external constraints upon agencies. We then relentlessly analyze these 
external constraints as if they were the major determinants of agency effi  cacy, 
procedural fairness and legal legitimacy. Yet, in many ways it is the internal law 
of administration—the memoranda, guidelines, circulars and customs within 
agencies that most powerfully mold the behavior of administrative offi  cials.”2 
Not Judicial Control of Administrative Action,3 but getting inside administration 
has been the hallmark of Mashaw’s scholarship from its beginning4 to the 
present day.5 A public law curriculum with the same ends would permit 
students to encounter administrative law in just this way, as it is encountered 
by administrative actors and the public. It would engage them directly with 
their materials, require them to “see” the relationships within agencies, and 
between them and legislatures or central executives, just as the people in the 
agencies and those bodies do. The very fi rst teaching materials Jerry Mashaw 
edited provided just such encounters for his students. He did not ask students, 
to the virtual exclusion of other perspectives, to encounter these matters just 
through the eyes of reviewing courts, or in relation to what the judiciary might 
command. 
This, and the recent growth of required courses on legislation and regulation, 
suggested the possible interest of an essay exploring the extent to which 
American law students, through the years, might encounter legislatures and 
agencies other than through the eyes of the courts, which can be censorious 
and are inevitably retrospective and oriented to incidental litigation. To what 
extent have American law students been invited to view the work of legislatures 
and agencies from the perspectives of those lawmaking institutions themselves 
rather than from a judicial perspective? Although Hart and Sacks’s The Legal 
Process6 invited a brief detour in the middle of the past century, even today the 
law school curriculum endlessly invites attention to courts and the means by 
which they settle (that is to say, make) law. Well over a century ago, Harvard’s 
innovative Christopher Columbus Langdell treated law as a science whose 
2. Id.
3. LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
4. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public Choice Concerning 
Federally Aided Highway Construction, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1973); Jerry L. Mashaw, Welfare Reform 
and Local Administration of Aid to Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971). So too, 
two of his prize-winning books.  JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE 
FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) .
5. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED 
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
6. HENRY MELVIN HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). This work was fi nally brought into print 
in 1994 by Foundation Press. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey eds. 1994).
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raw materials were appellate judicial decisions alone.7 Has the Langdellian 
imperative to use only cases as the primary materials of law study prevailed in 
the study of legislatures and agencies as well? Do the materials of today’s new 
courses invite direct attention to these other institutions and their ways, before 
which lawyers so often must appear? Or do new course materials continue to 
present legislatures and agencies primarily through decided cases in which 
judges looked backwards over some particular, completed piece of work?
I.  Beginnings
Court-centered instruction has been with us since Langdell’s innovations 
captured law school curricula. Administrative law fi rst appeared in them 
around the turn of the twentieth century and, as Kevin Stack has forcefully 
reminded us,8 its birth coincided with the Langdellian ascendancy. In the 
earliest administrative law casebooks,9 says Stack, Ernst Freund 
emphasized both the role of legislation and public administration, including 
the methods agencies use to make decisions, as critical features of administrative 
law. Because exercises of administrative power must be authorized by 
legislation, Freund made clear that statutory construction was to be a central 
occupation for administrative law. “[T]he operation of general principles 
of administrative law is constantly aff ected, and frequently controlled by, 
the language of statutes.” As a result, Freund emphasized that statutory 
construction thus deserved a prominent place in a course on administrative 
law. Indeed, Freund argued, in light of the “rapid and enormous growth of 
public regulation of all kinds,” that principles of statutory construction are “as 
deserving of careful study as common-law principles.”10
But the University of Chicago’s brand-new law school had imported Freund’s 
Dean from Harvard, precisely to bring the case method with him. Although 
“Freund bemoaned the identifi cation of the fi eld of administrative law 
with judicial decisions,”11 the Dean would not permit him to off er a course 
7. Langdell’s approach excludes “the array of social, economic, and political forces that 
interacted with law. In Lawrence Friedman’s view, this made ‘Langdell’s science of law . . . 
a geology without rocks, an astronomy without stars.’” Stephen Dow, There’s Madness in the 
Method: A Commentary on Law, Statistics, and the Nature of Legal Education, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 579, 586 
(2004), citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 617 (2d ed. 1985).
8. See Kevin M. Stack, Lessons from the Turn of the Twentieth Century for First-Year Courses on Legislation and 
Regulation, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 28 (2015).
9. ERNST FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1911)
10. Stack, supra note 8, at 34.
11. Id., citing Ernst Freund, The Correlation of Work for Higher Degrees in Graduate Schools and Law Schools, 
11 ILL. L. REV. 301, 306 (1916).
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on administrative law in the law school curriculum until he had produced 
materials based on cases.12 Freund complied.13 
“Cases only” remained dominant as the New Deal began, when Harvard 
Law School professors Felix Frankfurter and J. Forrester Davison published 
Cases and Other Materials on Administrative Law.14 In its preface one fi nds these apt 
words: 
Since we are dealing with law in the making, this collection draws upon all 
sources that help to make law—cases, statutes, legislative debates, rules and 
regulations, legal writings and lay comment . . . . One cannot, then, stress too 
much the tentative stages of hypothesis and generalization in Administrative 
Law, and the predominant importance of knowing the anatomy and 
physiology of the law-making agencies that are neither legislature not courts 
but partake of the functions of both.15
This is well said, but well over ninety percent of the book’s 1150 pages present 
judicial decisions, edited but (in the Harvard style of the time) uncommented 
upon; and with the exception of introductory excerpts from the classic 
separation-of-powers literature, a brief ICC order, a couple of short statutory 
passages and twenty-fi ve pages of extracts from House of Lords debates, even 
the exceptional pages have as their subject courts and judicial review. The 
book presents “the anatomy and physiology of the law-making agencies” only 
as judges perceived them in the particular litigation that happened to have 
been put before them. Students see statutes and regulations only through their 
eyes. They view no legislative history independent of judicial preselection, 
no materials of rulemaking, or (with that brief and solitary exception) no 
administrative decision. Freund’s basic criticism of the book, that the materials 
are about constitutional law and judicial review, not administrative action as 
such, seems thoroughly justifi ed.
Walter Gellhorn, intellectual father of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
would publish the fi rst edition of his enduring teaching materials eight years 
12. Stack, supra note 8, at 40, citing WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 72 (1982) and Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s 
Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 617-18 (2007).
13. Only excerpts from judicial opinions appear in Freund’s fi rst edition. The second, 
published in 1928, added a few notes and statutory texts, and two excerpts from the annual 
reports of the ICC. ERNST FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1928). Freund 
stuck to his principles in important respects: The fi rst half of each edition was devoted 
to “Administrative Power and Action,” before reaching (wholly judicial) “Relief against 
Administrative Action.” Issues of constitutional law (e.g., “delegation”) were essentially left 
to courses in that subject.
14. FELIX FRANKFURTER & J. FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1932). Ernst Freund, to whom the book is dedicated, wrote a not-
wholly-appreciative review. Ernst Freund, Book Review, 46 HARV. L. REV. 167 (1932) (noting 
its limited focus on constitutional issues and the courts).
15. FRANKFURTER & DAVISON, supra note 14 at vii-viii.
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later.16 Here, too, judicial opinions dominate—although, in what would come 
to be a recognizable Columbia style, they might be more stringently edited, 
and rich notes and text discussions frequently appear. An introductory essay 
and secondary source excerpts marshal strong arguments for the necessity and 
propriety of administrative agencies, and against the bar’s then near-hysteria 
respecting administrative adjudications (rulemaking was not yet a subject). 
Although strongly evoking the likelihood of good faith and regularity in public 
servants’ behavior, the materials neither promise nor provide attention to the 
internal law of administration; nor do they provide primary materials refl ecting 
external controls other than judicial ones. After about 300 pages on issues of 
constitutional structure (both separation and delegation of powers), the next 
400 pages would have extensively engaged Gellhorn’s students various issues 
about the law of administrative hearings—notice, fair hearing, and fi ndings—
before reaching two fi nal chapters given over to judicial controls. This 
chooses Freund’s organization over Frankfurter’s. Note, however, that only 
administrative adjudication at the hearing stage—that is, the agency equivalent 
of trials—was considered, and its consideration came from the perspective 
of judicial overseers. This constituted a powerful argument in the bar’s 
contemporary debates about the propriety of administrative adjudications, 
but was still very much in thrall to the commitment to cases as the material of 
legal study. 
II.  The Legal Process
By midcentury, other materials had begun to intrude into the law school 
classroom. Scholarly excerpts were common; primary law materials other than 
cases and direct attention to institutions other than courts, less so. The Legal 
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law by Henry M. Hart, Jr., and 
Albert M. Sacks17 was a notable exception. Enormously infl uential although 
unprinted in its time18—taught from mimeographed pages—the material 
from its very beginning confronted law students with other institutions and 
their work, materials of the legal process that had not been predigested by 
courts. The authors’ famous introductory problem, “The Signifi cance of an 
Institutional System: The Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes,” is particularly 
striking in this respect. Preceding the three judicial decisions by which 
“the case” was ultimately resolved were forty pages of materials engaging 
students with factual background, statutory text and its legislative history in 
some detail, regulatory text from the Department of Agriculture, important 
16. WALTER GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (1940).
17. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
18. Its intellectual roots and infl uence are thoroughly explored in the lengthy essay with which 
William Eskridge and the late Philip Frickey prefaced the published edition, An Historical and 
Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, IN HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li-cxxxvi (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994).
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information about state law and trade practice, and, fi nally, the Department’s 
administrative decision.
While two later chapters understandably consider “The Courts as Places 
of Initial Resort for Solving Problems Which Fail of Private Solution” and 
“The Role of the Courts in the Interpretation of Statutes,” four other chapters 
are organized around other instrumentalities and the primary materials 
of their working. Only seven opinions appear in the 158 pages devoted to 
private ordering, consuming less than twenty percent of them; they appear 
after students’ have been asked to consider, independent of them, other 
materials from other actors. Three hundred fi fteen pages on legislatures and 
the legislative process introduce their structure and work in detail. Many of 
these pages are textual, describing legislative process, actors, and problems, 
not judicial perspectives. The problems place students in or before legislative 
bodies, and the three judicial opinions in the chapter appear as elements of 
the background notes students must work through to respond to problems 
set in legislatures. These notes devote many more pages to primary legislative 
materials—statutory language (as enacted or in draft) to be read independent 
of judicial views, legislative history documents or testimony, legislative 
procedural rules, etc.
The much shorter and admittedly incomplete chapter titled “The Executive 
Branch and the Administrative Process” put students before executive actors.19 
Given factual background, statutory provisions, and executive order, they were 
required to advise President Truman on the seizure of steel plants before being 
permitted to read Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.20 Then, with Baltimore 
city ordinances and no judicial opinions in hand, they were asked to analyze 
two problems involving issues that, in part, would reach the Supreme Court 
in Frank v. Maryland21 the year after the tentative edition appeared. Finally, as 
agency legal advisors, they had to read agency decisional documents and an 
independent discussion of the legislative history of the pertinent provision to 
comprehend brief excerpts from a Supreme Court opinion.
Such problems were essential to Hart and Sacks’s remarkable 
accomplishment. They repeatedly required students to study primary 
materials other than judicial opinions and to imagine interacting with primary 
actors other than judges—materials and actors that had to be seen prior to and 
independent of their coming into judicial view. The materials’ insistence on 
student understanding of numerous institutions, all acting within and upon or 
under law but doing so on their own terms, was their perhaps underappreciated 
contribution. Given the relative underdevelopment of “The Executive Branch 
and the Administrative Process,” one cannot confi dently fi nd here a turn back 
to the internal law of administrative agencies; but the overall approach strongly 
suggests that this is where a later edition, tentative or not, would have landed.
19. See, e.g., id.  at 1046, 1059-60, 1109.
20. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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III.  And After a Generation 
Three works of the mid-1970s permit an impressionistic assessment of the 
impact that this approach did or did not have in focusing the attention of 
public law teaching materials on other-than-judicial actors. One fi nds move-
ment from the case-centered norm, but not to the extent Hart and Sacks 
appeared to promise. Consider in that regard the following three examples.
A.  Walter Gellhorn & Clark Byse, Administrative Law—Cases and
Comments (6th ed. 1974)22
Hart and Sacks’s approach might have infl uenced the Sixth Edition of 
Gellhorn & Byse, Administrative Law—Cases and Comments. In 1940, Gellhorn had 
worked with Hart and another on materials for the courses on legislation 
they were teaching, in which the problem method was the chief pedagogical 
innovation.23 But where Hart argued for directly engaging students with 
legislatures and their materials, Gellhorn insist[ed] on more elaborate, 
doctrinally focused organization. His co-editor Clark Byse had been a colleague 
of Hart and Sacks’s since 1957. Yet aside from its use of a short supplement 
setting problems24 (but not providing primary materials), the 1974 edition of 
Gellhorn-Byse revealed few signs of Hart and Sacks’s infl uence. Throughout, 
it required its students to respond to and evaluate judicial decisions and 
commentary rather than engage in legal practice outside of court. Early pages 
introduced them to Congress’s extrastatutory (budgetary and oversight) 
controls over agency action, and to the possibilities for presidential controls. 
Even so, the predominant focus was on doctrine, not institutions and their 
functioning. Students would read more than 400 pages of material on judicial 
control of administrative action before turning to that action itself; the internal 
structures of agencies and issues about their operation, seen through judicial 
eyes, appeared only in the fi nal chapter.
B.  Jerry Mashaw & Richard Merrill, Introduction to the American Public
Law System (1975)25
The Legal Process appears to have had a greater infl uence on Mashaw and 
Merrill’s Introduction to the American Public Law System—materials that like today’s 
legislation and regulation materials were designed specifi cally for the fi rst 
year of law school. A course treating legislation and administrative action 
as subjects independently worthy of early, serious study, side by side, gave 
its students a clearer picture of the actual American legal system than a fi rst-
22. WALTER GELLHORN & CLARK BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—CASES AND COMMENTS (6th ed. 
1974).
23. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL 
PROCESS, in HART & SACKS, supra note 18, at li, lxxiv. 
24. WALTER GELLHORN, CLARK BYSE & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROBLEMS FOR 
USE IN CONJUNCTION WITH GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 6TH ED (1978).
25. JERRY L. MASHAW & RICHARD A. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS (1975).
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year curriculum wholly committed to cases and the common law. The editors 
stressed their “functional perspective,”26 saying their “larger and primary aim 
is to bring an integration of administrative law into the larger fabric of the 
legal order”27 by “integrat[ing] analysis of the administrative process with ways 
of thinking about the legislative process.”
Correspondingly, their book began with a study of the development 
and implementation of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act. Before reaching 
highly contested Supreme Court opinions and extensive notes on statutory 
interpretation technique, this chapter obliged students to understand the 
development of a complicated set of statutory materials controlling discharges 
into navigable waterways and to advise an Assistant Attorney General about 
several issues of interpretation and policy. After the cases, materials on 
criminal enforcement of the act against polluters brought them to discussions 
between government prosecutors and congressional committees. A fourth 
section, on administrative implementation, turned on a presidential executive 
order that directed the creation of a discharge permit program and assigned 
responsibilities for it to various agencies, congressional testimony about the 
program then established, and statutory materials addressing the President’s 
authority to reorganize governmental agencies. The chapter ended with a 
discussion of the congressional reaction. Cases, yes; but the students had to 
read and interpret for themselves relatively complex statutory text, and they 
encountered as other primary material a presidential executive order and 
several excerpts from congressional testimony, all in the service of the authors’ 
“larger and primary aim.”
Following this chapter and two considering judicial restrictions on legislative 
processes, almost 100 pages of materials on agency rulemaking—the subject 
virtually missing from Gellhorn-Byse—preceded only slightly longer materials on 
agency adjudication. In all these chapters, it is fair to say “judicial control 
of” were the words that introduced virtually every chapter subheading. But 
then came a chapter on “agency choice of mode of action,” in which, again, 
the students’ gaze was strongly diverted from the courts. Perhaps presaging 
Merrill’s two years of service as Chief Counsel to the FDA, beginning in 
the year these materials were published, more than eighty pages eff ectively 
placed the student inside the FDA, dealing with its implementation of 1962 
amendments to its basic statute. The students had to master extensive statutory 
and regulatory texts and administrative history to deal eff ectively with a course 
of judicial decisions interpreting the statute. The materials’ consistent focus 
on FDA actions, interpretations and regulatory dilemmas invited continuous 
discussion of the FDA’s internal administrative law. In these pages, “judicial 
control of” was the secondary, not primary, focus; the cases were among the 
building blocks provided for an FDA attorney, not doctrine to be learned.
26. Id. at xvii.
27. Id. at xviii. 
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C.  Hans Linde & George Bunn, Legislative and Administrative Processes (1976)28
Another book suggesting the Hart and Sacks model was Hans Linde 
and George Bunn’s Legislative and Administrative Processes, which appeared the 
following year. These materials more fully presaged today’s leg-reg courses 
in their thorough treatment of Congress and administrative agencies as 
institutions, and their disciplined attention to political as well as legal controls 
on agency behavior. Indeed, while students often encountered law through 
judicial opinions as well as statutory and regulatory texts, the latter often 
dominated.29 What they did not fi nd as doctrinal headings were “statutory 
interpretation,”30 “scope of review,” or “access to judicial review.” Issues 
concerning courts as courts, judicial processes as subject matter, were left to the 
many other law school courses in which they would appear. While in relation to 
administrative action the focus of the book (like the others of its time) was on 
adjudication and not rulemaking, “it touches on administrative adjudications 
only insofar as they diff er from litigation in courts.”31 No students studying 
these materials could have failed to leave them without understanding that 
statutory and administrative materials must be dealt with independently of 
judicial decisions, or that legislatures and agencies were institutions acting in 
both a political and a legal environment, and in themselves worthy of study. 
D.  Langdell Triumphant
Neither Mashaw-Merrill nor Linde-Bunn survived. Mashaw and his co-
authors transformed their work into a standard set of administrative law 
teaching materials, abandoning its innovative turn. The book has returned 
to the legislature only in its most recent edition.32 The Linde-Bunn materials 
had supplanted a fi rst-year course long taught at Wisconsin33 (where Bunn 
28. HANS A. LINDE & GEORGE BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES (1976).
29. The detailed Table of Contents for Chapter 3, “Legislative Process,” for example, listed 
as primary materials for its 261 pages: 15 cases, 16 statutes or bills, 18 passages from 
committee reports or hearing testimony, 24 excerpts from the literature (all but two focused 
on legislatures, not courts or judicial doctrine), and six documents generated within the 
executive branch. Chapter 6, “The Administrative Agency—Responsibility and Control” 
showed a similar imbalance between cases (two) and documents generated within the 
executive or legislative branches (16), and literature excerpts concerning them (seven). 
Other chapters were more heavily case-oriented, but not to the exclusion of primary and 
secondary materials generated by or about the political branches.
30. The sixth of seven subsections in Chapter 3, “Legislative Process,” dealt with “Legislative 
History,” approaching it from the perspective of understanding how judicial uses of it may 
aff ect legislators’ behavior. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 149 (2001), rather than as an element of instruction about statutory interpretation by 
courts.
31. LINDE & BUNN, supra note 28, at xviii.
32. JERRY MASHAW, RICHARD MERRILL, PETER SHANE, ELIZABETH MAGILL, MARIANO-FLORENTINO 
CUELLAR & NICHOLAS PARRILLO, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2014). 
33. LLOYD GARRISON & WILLARD HURST, LAW IN SOCIETY, A COURSE DESIGNED FOR 
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was Dean) using materials rivaling Hart-Sacks; that earlier course had become 
unpopular with students, who thought it political science, not real law. The 
substitution did not catch hold. Linde-Bunn never reached a second edition. 
Habituation to the case method, perhaps, and/or the diffi  culty of engaging 
students with institutions other than courts—with statutory and administrative 
materials as primary sources for learning and application—appear to have 
claimed it as a victim.34
The Langdellian commitment to courts and their opinions as the proper 
medium of law study—indeed the implicit proposition that the common law 
is what law is about—has dominated law schools’ fi rst-year curricula ever 
since his time, even as the practice of law, if it ever was that unidimensional, 
has shifted steadily toward statutory regimes and their administrators. In a 
remarkable conversation before Harvard Law students in the fall of 2015, 
Justice Elena Kagan and Professor John Manning recalled their Harvard 
education in the mid-’80s.35 At the school of Hart and Sacks, the curriculum 
was devoid of disciplined, and certainly of fi rst-year, attention to statutes. 
Until ten years ago, Harvard Law School’s fi rst-year curricular requirements 
remained essentially as they had been for a century (civil procedure, contracts, 
criminal law, property and torts). Hence, the “case method” remained fi rmly in 
place—altered, to be sure, by the eff ects legal realism, critical legal studies, law 
and economics, and other challenges had in shattering the “science” illusion, 
but juricentric nonetheless. Indeed, when in 2006 Harvard introduced a 
required course in legislation and regulation into the fi rst-year curriculum, the 
Langdellian commitment remained in place. Professors John Manning and 
Matthew Stephenson self-consciously agreed that the materials they prepared 
for the new course would “follow the familiar, case-oriented approach—relying 
on appellate opinions and notes and comments on those opinions as the main 
course materials and the focus of the discussion.”36 At Yale, today’s required 
curriculum remains essentially what it was when I was a student there fi fty-
four years ago—and long before that. First-year students must still take civil 
procedure, constitutional law, contracts and torts in the fi rst semester, as I 
did, and criminal law and administration (but no longer property) at some 
UNDERGRADUATES AND BEGINNING LAW STUDENTS (1940), succeeded by CARL A. AUERBACH & 
SAMUEL MERMIN, LEGAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL, 
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1956). Like the tentative edition of 
HART & SACKS, supra note 17, both were informally produced but, centered on Wisconsin law 
and the particular problems of workers’ compensation, neither was widely circulated. For 
many years, the book by LINDE & BUNN, supra note 28, was also used as part of the fi rst-year 
course materials at the University of Oregon’s School of Law.
34. I am indebted to William Whitford, Professor Emeritus at Wisconsin, for the information 
preceding this footnote. (Emails to the author, Jan. 12 and 23, 2015). A quarter-century later, 
Columbia’s regulatory state course would suff er the same fate, for the same reasons.
35. See Harvard Law Sch., The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.
36. John F. Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation & Regulation and Reform of the First Year, 
65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (2015).
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subsequent point. Other than these courses, encounters with public law and 
its primary materials are not required.
IV.  The Current Day
A.  Courses in Administrative Law and Legislation
Fast-forward to the current day, and one fi nds strongly revived interest 
in studying legislation and, in particular, statutory interpretation—thanks in 
good part to the work of Jerry Mashaw’s colleague William Eskridge, Jr., and 
his co-authors. Administrative law is fi nding its way into bar examinations 
and is increasingly understood by students to be a required course, whether or 
not their curriculum so provides. But the doctrinal and judicial orientation of 
these courses remains strong. That is certainly the case with the administrative 
law materials I have co-edited since the seventh edition’s appearance in 1979.37 
While our book deals extensively with events at the agency level before 
explicitly reaching the issues of judicial review, and includes considerable 
discussion of both internal agency action and relations with its political 
overseers, virtually all its primary materials are decided cases and its focus 
is on judicial doctrine. Only the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure 
Act, and Executive Order 12,866 and its amendments are presented as texts 
students must deal with independently of judicial decisions. In teaching the 
course, however, I insist that students become familiar with agency and White 
House websites, and view the rulemaking process as it is occurring through 
those lenses. The Rivers and Harbors Act, along with attention to Congress 
(understood as an institution on its own) and to the FDA’s struggles with 
the 1972 Amendments to its fundamental statutes, all long ago disappeared 
from Jerry Mashaw’s casebook, now in its Seventh Edition (2014) and retitled 
Administrative Law—The American Public Law System—Cases and Materials. Here, too, 
the primary materials students encounter are with few exceptions judicial 
decisions, and the understandings they strive for, consequently, are doctrinal. 
They do not encounter a notice of proposed rulemaking or an adopted rule, 
except as judges or the authors might describe them. A brief section on 
electronic rulemaking does not even identify the URL for the government’s 
e-rulemaking site, much less suggest that students observe a rulemaking there. 
Besides Executive Order 12,866 and its impacts on rulemaking—issues not 
open to judicial review—attention to administrative law teaching materials, 
generally, follows this pattern.
For courses on legislation, contemporary teaching materials typically 
address Congress as a functioning institution and the problems of statutory 
interpretation. The fi rst can hardly be accomplished by reading judicial 
decisions; some combination of legislative documents, exposition, and 
secondary literature excerpts must be dominant. For statutory interpretation, 
by comparison, the case method reasserts itself. Of course judges do read 
37. PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF, CYNTHIA R. FARINA & GILLIAN E. METZGER, GELLHORN 
AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (11th ed. 2011) (current edition).
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statutes, and the continuing controversies among them about how this might 
best be done require making one’s students aware of that.38 But are they the 
only ones to do so?
Today, reading statutes (and regulations) constitutes a major part of 
lawyers’ work, if not the majority, as compared with reading cases. In any 
uncertain matter, lawyers and their clients must usually read them before 
their meaning has been judicially resolved. Very often those statutes are fi rst 
read by agencies, both within themselves and in dealings with the public. Are 
the students of today’s legislation courses often required to read statutes for 
themselves, before judges get to them, with such aids to understanding as 
may then be available? This, in eff ect, was what the Legal Process materials, 
Mashaw-Merrill, and Linde-Bunn required of them. But the teaching materials of 
today’s legislation courses often require students to dig out the statute being 
interpreted from the interstices of a judicial opinion, with only such elements 
of it as the opinion writer(s) found relevant to include.39 If the materials 
provide statutory text before the opinion, as do Professor Eskridge’s two 
new editions, discussed below, they are not given a problem to consider that 
might lead them independently to see statutory issues, or the other materials a 
private lawyer or an agency lawyer would certainly consult; they get no sense 
of the past history of the problem, other statutes that might be relevant, or 
its political or legislative history (again, besides such elements as the opinion 
writer(s) chose to include). Students are not, in other words, invited to read 
the statutes for themselves.
B.  The New Course in Legislation and Regulation
The past quarter-century, starting perhaps with my school’s ultimately 
failing eff ort to create a required fi rst-year course on the regulatory state, has 
seen a steady movement toward courses on legislation and regulation—today’s 
predominant sources of law—as required elements of fi rst-year curricula.40 
The phenomenon is a long-overdue reaction to the continued dominance of 
common-law, judicially oriented doctrinal analysis courses in the fi rst year, 
conveying to entering students a strikingly inaccurate sense of the current 
world of law.41 At least six sets of law school teaching materials have recently 
38. See Peter L. Strauss, Robert Katzmann’s Judging Statutes, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443 (2015) (book 
review).
39. Professor Eskridge’s two new editions, discussed infra, now frequently depart from this 
pattern by placing the relevant statutory texts before opinions interpreting them. Focusing 
student attention on what will prove to be the problem for the court by briefl y also stating a 
problem could further ingrain the habits of careful reading any attorney must cultivate.
40. Abbe R. Gluck, The Ripple Eff ect of “Leg-Reg” on the Study of Legislation and Administrative Law in 
the Law School Curriculum, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 121, 126-27 (2015) (showing that twenty-one law 
schools of the top ninety-nine, according to the 2014 U.S. News Rankings, currently require a 
course on legislation or leg-reg in the fi rst-year curriculum).
41. The impact of distorted fi rst impressions can be enduring. Consider the experience at McGill 
Law School, which for many years off ered its students degrees qualifying graduates for both 
common-law and civil-law qualifi cation. I visited there earlier this century, a visit that led to 
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been published for use in connection with the fi rst-year courses on legislation 
and regulation that are increasingly fi nding their way into that year’s required 
curriculum.42 All present political institutions and agencies, statutes and 
regulations as central actors and elements in the legal world, but they off er a 
wide range of approach. To what extent, however, do these curricular changes 
presage a change from the Langdellian commitments to using appellate 
judicial decisions and to teaching doctrine?
1.  John F. Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation43
Langdell dies hard at Harvard, as we have seen. In their preface, Professors 
Manning and Stephenson describe their purpose as being “to teach students 
both how federal statutory and regulatory law is made, and how judges and 
administrative interpreters construe these legal materials.”44 Notice that this 
teaching is to be about “how judges and administrative interpreters construe,” 
and not about how lawyers do. Consistent with Langdellian premises, 
Manning and Stephenson lead their students almost invariably to see issues 
gazing backward in relation to the already explained interpretations of judges 
and administrators, and not forward, in the absence of fi xed meanings, to 
advise clients about important choices. That the purpose of learning “how 
judges and administrative interpreters construe” statutes dominates the work 
is suggested by the omission of legislation from the list of courses in the 
upper-level curriculum for which it might serve as a foundation,45 and also 
my Peter L. Strauss, Transsystemia—Are We Approaching a New Langdellian Moment? Is McGill Showing 
the Way?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 161 (2006).  There, I learned that when this was done in a four-
year program, with students spending their fi rst year studying beginning courses in the 
system of their choice and their second year studying the same issues in the other, with two 
years of electives to follow, graduates were marked by their choices. If they had begun on 
the common-law side, they graduated as common lawyers who knew some civil law, and vice 
versa.  When McGill then converted its program into a three-year program, in which fi rst-
year courses were off ered transsystemically—that is, on a problem basis, with civilian and 
common-law materials presented side by side (and bilingually) as equally possible means 
of response—it found that these self-identifi cations to one system or the other disappeared. . 
42. All from a 2014 AALS meeting panel on Leg-Reg Courses and the Core Curriculum, 65 J. LEG. 
EDUC. 1 (2015). See James J. Brudney, Legislation and Regulation in the Core Curriculum: A Virtue or a 
Necessity?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (2015); Kevin M. Stack, Lessons from the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
for First-Year Courses on Legislation and Regulation, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 28 (2015); John F. Manning 
& Matthew Stephenson, Legislation & Regulation and Reform of the First Year, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 
(2015); Dakota S. Rudesill, Christopher J. Walker & Daniel P. Tokaji, A Program in Legislation, 
65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 70 (2015); Deborah A. Widiss, Making Sausage: What, Why and How to Teach 
about Legislative Process in a Legislation or Leg-Reg Course, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 96 (2015); Gluck, supra 
note 40. 
43. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2nd ed. 
2013).
44. Id. at v.
45. In her contribution to the Journal of Legal Education Symposium, Professor Gluck, supra note 
40, reports that the new leg-reg courses appear to be displacing legislation as an upperclass 
course, but not administrative law. Id. at 153. To the extent those courses examine the 
institutional functioning of legislatures, that loss counsels assuring that the new courses 
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by the materials’ virtual absence of attention to Congress and administrative 
agencies as institutions functioning on their own internal law.46 Consideration 
of internal agency processes of decision, as distinct from statutory and judicial 
requirements for them, is simply missing. Other than the Constitution and 
relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the only nonjudicial 
materials used as primary readings are Executive Order 12,866 and a 
presidential memorandum on clean-water protection. The materials simply 
fail to engage students with primary materials other than judicial opinion.
The materials are, however, very well-adapted to teaching “how judges 
and administrative interpreters construe [statutory and regulatory law].” 
The fi rst two chapters address statutory interpretation, the fourth (largely) 
APA interpretation in the rulemaking context, and the fi fth judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretation.47 Taking the fi rst chapter as an example, its 
introductory section, after well framing the general questions students will 
want to consider, opens with the example of TVA v. Hill,48 a case that preceded 
the revival of sharp controversy over interpretive technique yet opens many of 
these questions. And here, atypically, students are asked to read the statutory 
provisions at issue (albeit they are not given facts or a problem that might 
help them to do so before encountering the court’s reading). Note materials 
point out the several interpretive tools the Justices used and the background 
and subsequent history of the statute, suggesting the essentially retrospective 
application of the Endangered Species Act the decision entailed. The brief 
introduction to Congress’s legislative process is also a part of this section.
The second section of the chapter, “The Letter Versus the Spirit of the Law,” 
makes clear both the breadth of scholarship brought to this enterprise and the 
balance of its authors in engaging students with it. John Manning is deservedly 
regarded as the leading academic scholar supporting the “new textualism,” 
the letter as against the spirit, but the case selections, richly annotated notes, 
and questions posed should leave students with a sense of the tensions, of 
the strong arguments on each side of this divide, of some movement toward 
an accommodating center, a new textually constrained purposivism alongside 
consider legislatures as functioning institutions, as well as the appropriate means by which 
outsiders may deal with their end products. 
46. There is no hint here of congressional disarray or of the realities of legislative drafting and 
processing revealed in Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman’s pathbreaking scholarship. See 
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014). A good deal 
more emerges, however, in the interstices of their subsequent discussions of the debates over 
the use of legislative history.
47. This chapter essentially is devoted to Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Statutory interpretation by agencies, whose techniques arguably are infl uenced by their 
responsibilities and by their continuous contact with both their constitutive statutes and 
with Congress, is discussed only as it may infl uence judicial interpretation.
48. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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a new (and more moderate) textualism. Students are consistently engaged 
in a real debate, with well-chosen cases to illustrate it and no clear outcome 
required. Section III, “What Is the Text?” (Scientifi c or Ordinary Meaning? 
Legal Terms of Art? Colloquial Meaning or Dictionary Meaning), Section IV, 
“Legislative History” (Post New-Deal Approach, Textualist Critique, The New 
Synthesis), and Section V, “The Judicial Power and Equitable Interpretation,” 
continue in the same vein. Again, the materials are all judicial opinions. The 
section on legislative history fully and fairly presents the history of use and 
abuse of legislative history; what it does not ever do is present students with 
the challenge of considering legislative history documents on their own rather 
than seeing them through the selective eyes of opinion writers.
Other than the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the only nonjudicial materials used as primary readings in 
Manning-Stephenson are Executive Order 12,866 and a presidential memorandum 
on clean-water protection, as the principal readings for a section on “Presidential 
Control of Agencies.” The Executive Order is introduced by way of a 
thoughtful history adumbrating the political debates over its appropriateness 
and uses, but without a suggestion to students of a posture they might take in 
reading it. For example, they might be asked
 As an OIRA administrator, are you now in a position to control the 
subjects on which rulemaking occurs? 
 If you are a desk offi  cer in OIRA, what opportunities are you given to 
infl uence the outcomes of a particular agency rulemaking? 
 If you are an agency rulemaker, how will these requirements infl uence 
the outcomes you reach? Public participation in your rulemakings? 
 What, if any, defenses will you have against White House “meddling”? 
The notes following the Order fi rst take four-and-a-half pages for a balanced 
and richly annotated account of the debates over the appropriateness of 
presidential control, and then give similar space and attention to the debates 
over the use of cost-benefi t analysis. President Clinton’s Memorandum on Clean 
Water Protection, directing EPA and other agencies to take certain defi ned 
steps to protect the quality of recreational water bodies, serves to introduce a 
further discussion of the appropriate level of presidential infl uence or control 
over matters statutorily assigned to agencies for decision. The questions are 
well-identifi ed, and the literature bearing on them fully and fairly presented. 
The materials do not, but of course the instructor could, invite students to 
consider what their agency should/must do on receiving such a memorandum.
A colleague teaching the upperclass off ering in administrative law expressed 
some concern to me last spring about the overlap of her syllabus with what she 
understood had been dealt with in a fi rst-year elective taught from Manning-
Stephenson. Probably if one knew one’s students had studied its thorough 
treatment of the Constitution’s bearing on agency rulemaking and of standards 
of judicial review of rulemaking and Chevron—more than 200 pages of the book 
in each case—one could feel free to spend more time on issues not at all touched 
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(e.g., due process, APA adjudication, agency enforcement, agency decision 
processes, information acquisition and FOIA, access to judicial review) and to 
deepen the treatment of rulemaking and its associated statutory and executive 
controls. Thus, the overlap with administrative law is only partial. Despite its 
relative inattention to institutional concerns, a course taught from this book 
is much more likely to provide an alternative to legislation courses than to 
administrative law. And in this respect, in my judgment, its most signifi cant 
weakness (but not one that distinguishes it from other teaching materials on 
the subject) is the consistency with which it makes students critics and not 
actors, inviting them to the interpretive task after, and not before, judges and 
administrators have performed it. 
2.  Samuel Estreicher & David L. Noll, Legislation and the Regulatory State49
Aside from the question about Langdellian change, Professors Samuel 
Estreicher and David L. Noll’s Legislation and Regulatory State (recently published 
in both print and electronic editions by LexisNexis with an available 
documentary supplement) also has much to commend it for fi rst-year use. 
Although appellate decisions are virtually the only primary materials its 
detailed table of contents identify,50 the notes following them consistently 
invite attention to case and doctrinal analysis issues reinforcing the book’s 
overall “regulatory state” theme and important student habits. 
 What is the procedural posture here?
 How was a described doctrinal issue analyzed? 
 What other possibilities live in other cases or critical commentary? 
 What was the justifi cation for regulation here? 
 What was the mode of regulation employed? 
 What alternatives were possible? 
Congressional and executive branch institutions and practices are well-
described, if somewhat idealistically.51 The notes often challenge the 
49. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, LEGISLATION AND THE REGULATORY STATE (2015). 
These paragraphs are based on prepublication materials the authors kindly provided in May 
2015. Thus, some details may have changed.
50. The exceptions are Federalist No. 10, E.O. 12,866, and the Customs Service letter that 
eventuated in Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
51. Chapter 2, “The Legislative Process and Statutory Interpretation” draws on the works of 
Robert Katzmann, and Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner in its discussions of statutory 
interpretation, but not on works like Thomas Mann & Norman Orenstein’s prominent 
scholarship on the current congressional disarray, or Abbe Gluck & Lisa Bressman’s study of 
the realities of congressional drafting practice. In discussing presidential control of agency 
action, the book commendably reproduces for discussion a well-edited text of one of Judge 
Korman’s decisions respecting presidential pressure on the FDA’s decisions about over-the-
counter availability of day-after-intercourse contraceptives, Tummino v. Torti, 603 F.Supp.2d 
519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), but does not refer to Lisa Heinzerling’s The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for 
Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927 (2014) or many other secondary works about presidential 
thumbs on the scale.
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judicial analysis or raise interesting questions about its subsequent use, but 
typically do so in relation to other judicial decisions or agency action. The 
secondary literature is generally referred to, though not presented for active 
consideration.52 The supplement provides many statutory texts, and also some 
other-than-case primary materials such as are generally missing from this and 
other primary sets of teaching materials.
A sense of the book’s strengths and weaknesses, the performance it does 
and does not demand of the reader, might be provided by looking in some 
detail at its treatment of a judicial opinion involving statutory interpretation. 
Maracich v. Spears53 is the fi rst case students encounter in the materials on 
statutory interpretation, and it is one of the three for which the documentary 
supplement sets out statutes and legislative history excerpts. Several aspects 
of it make it an especially good choice for this purpose. Like many of the 
opinions in the book, it is contemporary. The issue it presents—whether a 
federal statute possibly bans an attorney’s obtaining and using Department of 
Motor Vehicles information about recent purchasers of automobiles to solicit 
participation in a possible class action—is readily understood, apolitical, 
and likely to command future attorneys’ interest. A decision in the matter 
required the Supreme Court’s close analysis of statutory text and context 
(and legislative history?). That decision was reached by a 5-4 margin; the 
majority opinion adopted an interpretation of the text that was far from the 
reading most easily given it and—perhaps most important to this appraisal—
rather dramatically departed from the usual conservative-liberal alignments 
students might expect. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the Chief Justice, 
and Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito, that the 
attorney’s conduct violated the statute in an opinion suggesting but not 
stating that he had consulted legislative history,54 and openly using many of 
the tools of contemporary textualism. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (who 
in somewhat similar “purpose and context v. plain meaning” circumstances 
would fi nd purpose and context controlling in the very next case presented55), 
dissented for herself and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena 
52. For more on the causes of statutory blind spots and the interpretative challenges they create, 
see, for example, ROBERT KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014), JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: 
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY (Robert Katzmann ed. 1988); Amanda Frost, Certifying 
Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, 
A Mechanism for Statutory Housekeeping: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 131 (2007); Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative 
Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123 (1992); Victoria F. 
Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 575 (2002).
53. 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013).
54. “Congress was aware that personal information from motor vehicle records could be used for 
solicitation, and it permitted it in circumstances that it defi ned, with the specifi c safeguard of 
consent by the person contacted. So the absence of the term ‘solicitation’ in (b)(4) is telling.” 
133 S. Ct. at 2203.
55. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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Kagan on the basis of what the statute plainly and permissibly said. Justices 
Sotomayor, Thomas and Kennedy also switched sides in that next opinion 
(Yates), one unusually rich with references to legislative history, and sharply 
illustrating the diffi  culties courts face in mediating text and purpose. These, 
then, are not cases that will feed student cynicism about the political valence 
of Supreme Court decision.
If in teaching one made disciplined use of the documentary supplement that 
accompanies the book, the juris-centric character of the main volume could be 
eased. Students are asked to review the statute at issue in Maracich, reproduced 
in the statutory supplement, before reading the opinion. The supplement 
includes relevant excerpts from the act in question and selected legislative 
history. Given a problem based on the case’s facts, students could have the 
opportunity to experience the matter as a lawyer would have; this would 
be the direct engagement with legislative history that Manning-Stephenson 
denies its users. The book would permit similar exercises at least three times 
over its course although, given the prominence and placement of the opinions 
in the book, one supposes students might not easily resist the temptation to 
shortcut that assignment. From the perspective of case and doctrinal analysis, 
for students just beginning their legal education, the choice of this case is 
excellent. It seems free from normative precommitments that might distract 
its students; its presentation teaches valuable habits for entering students. 
If, as one suspects, students fi nd the majority’s reading of the statute both 
surprising and, in purposive terms, compelling, the lesson to explore possible 
meanings of text before settling on an understood meaning is invaluable. 
At the same time, it is only that. Supplement aside, here as elsewhere in the 
book, the materials are about what courts do, not what attorneys do. Fresh, 
imaginative and thorough, still Estreicher-Noll never places students where they 
will often fi nd themselves, having to read a statute on a client’s behalf—often 
with the most important consequences turning on their reading—without a 
prior judicial reading to guide them. A teacher could fi ll the gap, if so minded, 
but the point here is that Langdell still rules—cases and doctrine are at the 
core.56
3.  Lisa Heinzerling & Mark Tushnet, The Regulatory and Administrative State57
Students taking Harvard’s course with Mark Tushnet and using his book—
the fi rst set of published materials designed for such a course58—would have 
56. So too with the book’s treatment of Executive Order 12,886, the core instrument of 
presidential dialogue with agencies over their rulemaking activities. Estreicher and Noll 
want their students to know what the Executive Order is and does, but never put their 
students in the shoes of agency lawyers, or lawyers from private enterprise who might wish 
to infl uence the process. Nor do they take the opportunity the order’s substance gives to 
discuss the arguable virtues and faults of cost-benefi t analysis. The focus on judicial issues, 
not the E.O. process as such, is striking.
57. LISA HEINZERLING & MARK TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2006).
58. Sidney A. Shapiro and Joseph P. Tomain had earlier published REGULATORY LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS, whose last (third) edition was published in 2003. It focused 
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a very diff erent experience from those studying with the Manning-Stephenson 
materials. The lead materials named in the detailed table of contents are 
primarily excerpts from the secondary literature, not judicial opinions.59 
Agency documents occasionally appear. The book’s fi rst two parts present 
regulation as an alternative to litigation, fi rst with respect to contracts, and 
then to criminal law or torts. 
 Do wages include a premium for taking risks? 
 Are criminal law and tort eff ective means for compensating persons for 
strangers’ infl iction of unacceptable risks on them? 
 Are they eff ective in the case of diff use, long-term (environmental) 
harms? 
The contrast both these parts off er to contracts and torts (common-law 
courses of the fi rst year) is strong and helpful in bringing student perceptions 
of the legal order forward into the twenty-fi rst century. They make the case for 
regulation as a necessity. Clearly enough, these materials have a point of view, 
refl ected in doubts cast on classical law-and-economics thinking, also well-
presented, and in the often gruesome facts of employer indiff erence to worker 
safety and industrial indiff erence to environmental harms to be found in the 
cases and secondary materials selected. But the fi nal chapter of these two parts, 
“Linking Common Law and Statutes: The Case of Workers’ Compensation,” 
is not merely a paean to regulation; it clearly communicates the ways in which 
the “great compromise”60 of workers’ compensation programs left a good deal 
of work for the courts and tort law to do in providing full compensation to 
workers and safety incentives to management.
Part III, “The Modern Regulatory State,” introduces students to the 
apparatus and procedures of regulation after fi ve weeks or so of the course 
is behind them. These will have been weeks in which they have studied a 
good deal of interdisciplinary material—economics, sociology, cognitive 
psychology—providing perspectives on situations (environmental harm, 
workplace injuries) by which the common law is challenged and for which 
regulation is common. Heinzerling and Tushnet’s modern regulatory state, 
as they acknowledge, is one concerned with environmental, health, and safety 
risks, the state of EPA, NHTSA and the FDA, not a fi nancial market (SEC) or 
monopoly control (utility rate regulation) state; instructors interested in other 
on the intellectual and legal grounding for regulation of various kinds—substance, methods, 
and measures of eff ectiveness—and not institutions or procedures as such. Congress, 
statutory interpretation and the Administrative Procedure Act scarcely appear.
59. Thirty-one judicial opinions appear in the detailed table of contents, HEINZERLING & 
TUSHNET, supra note 57, at xvii-xxix; seventy-four excerpts from the literature, and fi ve 
other documents: a criminal indictment, an agency report to Congress, an agency decision 
document, excerpts from an amicus curiae brief, and a White House memorandum to 
agency heads. Id.
60. See Alison D. Morantz, Rethinking the Great Compromise: What Happens When Large 
Companies Opt Out of Workers’ Compensation? (July 10, 2015), available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2629498.
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areas would have to supply those “ribs.” The work takes up the basic issues 
of statutory interpretation and rulemaking in a manner adequate to introduce 
them, but that will not persuade any students that they have plumbed their 
depths before returning to regulatory appraisal: 
 How can regulation fail, in theory or in practice? 
 What is cost-benefi t analysis, and the case for and against it? 
 Can providing risk-facing individuals with information to inform their 
decision-making be an eff ective alternative to command-and-control of 
the situations they face? 
 If standards are to be set, how are acceptable levels of residual risk best 
determined? 
Christopher Columbus Langdell would not recognize these as proper law 
school teaching materials. Interdisciplinary materials are as important to it, if 
not more so, than judicial opinions. Understanding the use of the courts, here, 
is only one of several options, not the ceaseless focus of a student’s attention. 
Much more than the other texts considered to this point, these materials 
continually place students outside the judicial system—usually, to be sure, 
from the critical perspective of academics or citizens, and not as lawyers asked 
to advise clients on matters of consequence to it. Both the understanding that 
institutions other than the courts are important to the legal order and the 
acquisition of critical tools for evaluating their work are important curricular 
contributions in the current day. In taking students beyond doctrine and 
beyond courts, as an introduction to the realities of today’s legal order and as 
a corrective to Langdell’s “geology without rocks,”61 they are far superior to 
doctrinally centered materials. Yet the extrajudicial materials of this book are 
interdisciplinary, not the primary materials of today’s law practice. Exercises 
like those possible with Estreicher-Noll’s Maracich materials would have to be 
built from scratch.
4.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Abbe R. Gluck & Victoria Nourse, Statutes, Regulation, 
and Interpretation—Legislation and Administration
in the Republic of Statutes62
Three of today’s most accomplished scholars of legislation—one of them an 
editor of The Legal Process as fi nally published—have joined forces to produce 
materials for a new course, one focused on the production and interpretation 
of statutes and regulations, without being centered on courts.63 Thus, the 
61. See supra note 7.
62. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA NOURSE, STATUTES, REGULATION, 
AND INTERPRETATION—LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 
(2014) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION].
63. Professor Eskridge has another dog in the hunt, the sixth of the sets mentioned in the prologue 
to this section, one that will not be discussed in the text for reasons that will shortly appear. 
The Fifth Edition of the pioneering materials he began with his co-editor on publication of 
The Legal Process (the late Philip P. Frickey) has now been retitled as WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
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introductory materials will convey to students that ‘how legislatures think 
about statutes’ and ‘how administrators think about statutes’ are just as 
important to the enterprise as ‘how judges think about statutes.’ As will be 
discussed, it is unfortunate that there is not equal analytic attention to “how 
lawyers think about statutes” and “how aff ected individuals think about 
statutes,”64 but this fault is hardly theirs alone. In comparison with Heinzerling-
Tushnet and Bressman-Rubin-Stack, these materials give relatively little attention 
to the issues of economic analysis, risk assessment, scientifi c judgment, and 
human psychology that so aff ect regulatory decision-making. (E.O. 12,866 
and its administration, for example, are described, but the order itself is not 
presented and the description of its operation and issues is largely in political 
terms). For primary materials other than judicial opinions and some statutory 
excerpts, students are directed to the place they can be found and are invited 
to consult them—saving pages, but reducing the possibility of in-class use 
and thus making that consultation less likely. Still, there is much to admire 
here. Problems regularly set in its pages place students in active, practice-
oriented roles. Particularly for teachers who understand, as Professor Gluck 
has reported,65 that this course is much more likely to displace the course in 
legislation than the course in administrative law, these new materials deserve 
the most serious consideration.
The three-part introduction, imaginatively built off  variations on the familiar 
“No Vehicles in the Park” problem, might be regarded as a set piece like “The 
Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes” in The Legal Process, though it is less richly 
developed. After describing some of the ways judges think about statutes, 
JR., PHILIP FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES & MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION—STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2014). In it, 
brief materials in the fi rst chapter—also centered on the Civil Rights Act of 1964—introduce 
agency implementation, and new Chapters 8 and 9, the fi nal quarter of the book, take up 
administrative implementation of statutes and the theme and variations on Chevron. Like 
the work discussed in the text, its introduction to administrative procedures is sketchy—the 
APA provision governing informal rulemaking does not appear in text, and only about half 
as many pages are addressed to that process (twelve) or to interpretive rules and policy 
statements (twenty-two). It does, like Bressman, Rubin & Stack, have the advantage of 
introducing the issues of presidential oversight subsequent to these pages. (Here, too, the 
text of the Executive Order is relegated to an appendix.) Statutory interpretation cases, as 
in the book discussed in text, are often preceded by the relevant text, a distinct improvement 
over past practice. Problems are used, but less frequently, to place students outside the 
courts; administrative agency documents scarcely appear. Probably the choice between the 
two books would depend on how far the instructor wished to depart from the materials of 
“Legislation,” for which both are excellent. There is more on Congress as a functioning 
institution here than there, and less on agencies.
64. The book’s preface properly notes as a contribution of the book that “we take a broader view 
of the prototypical legal interpreter. In addition to judges, members of Congress, agency 
offi  cials, and even state actors are a part of the interpretive process in the modern, multi-
layered legal landscape.” But the prototypical legal interpreters are not only, even chiefl y, 
government offi  cers, and a prototypical experience of the practicing attorney is having to 
interpret laws, on issues of large potential consequence, without yet having their aid.
65. See Gluck, note 40, supra.
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the fi rst problem invites students to consider the ordinance’s application 
to a variety of ostensible “vehicles.” Then at the conclusion of an imagined 
legislative process, 
 How could students use the history that has been described, and ought 
students be able to use that material, in appealing a conviction for a 
child’s use of a tricycle in the park?
 And after introducing administrators who might have the authority to 
defi ne prohibited “vehicles,” can students draft a proposed rule?
 How should a commission respond to a supposed comment supporting 
the inclusion of tricycles?
 How should it respond, having in mind both its political overseers, and 
the possibility of engagement with the courts?
Students cannot avoid understanding that diff ering institutions and procedures, 
not only courts, are involved in the generation and interpretation of law; so, 
too, will they understand that it is on their acts of law generation that the book 
is resolutely focused. And the following materials, unsurprisingly, confi rm 
this understanding, presented in three parts: an introduction to Congress, 
agencies and courts; statutory interpretation; and agencies and administrative 
implementation. The fi rst and third are resolutely multi-institutional; the 
materials on interpretation focus on courts and judicial doctrine, subjects on 
which all three authors are well-established scholars.
The fi rst part starts with attention to Congress, and then the executive 
branch, President and agencies, before moving on to the courts. The legislative 
process is introduced through the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
with particular attention to Rep. Howard Smith’s failed attempt to sabotage 
the process by his successful introduction of an amendment prohibiting sex 
discrimination. A problem requires students to advise their clients whether 
they can safely take affi  rmative action to redress decades of sex discrimination 
in employment—but as an exercise in interpretation, without attention to the 
possible consequences of either action or inaction that such clients would need 
to consider. Following ample descriptions of House and Senate processes, 
 How would students expect controversial legislation to proceed?
 Can students draft a bill?
 Get it past the veto gates?
Congress has a choice between courts and agencies as law enforcers; in 
representing NOW or the Chamber of Commerce, how can counsel work 
eff ectively to infl uence the authority Congress gives the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission? A handful of separation-of-powers cases are 
presented in considering constitutional limits on Congress’s authority to 
control agency and presidential behavior, but the focus of these materials is 
resolutely on the legislature and its behaviors.
The executive branch materials might more properly be described as an 
introduction to the President, including his relationship to agencies. He is 
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a presence throughout, with agencies and their functioning a subordinate 
interest. One reads a lot about his removal, about Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. 
Sawyer66 and about the War Powers Resolution (in connection with Libya) 
before any agency action, as such, is introduced. Here, any primary reading 
that is not a case involves advice to the President, a quasi-constitutional focus. 
Then one encounters FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,67 preceded by a 
discussion of the history of tobacco regulation by Congress and the FDA 
and relevant statutory sections. Students are invited to consider statutory 
arguments before reading the case, and one hopes they will—this is the sort 
of problem/assignment too often missing from our statutory teaching. One 
wonders, though—particularly given the chapter’s emphasis on the President 
as well as agencies—why they are not then also shown the presidential directive 
acknowledged in the following notes, or the agency’s regulation itself. These 
are materials any lawyer considering the situation would have had and used. 
Finally, there are some materials on cost-benefi t analysis (but not the executive 
orders themselves), again emphasizing the President rather than the view from 
inside the agency. An introductory problem, excellent from this perspective 
and principally considering congressional-presidential-agency relations, 
addresses OIRA pressures on the Department of Transportation respecting 
the implementation of a new statute on pilot fatigue—but students see only 
the statute and a descriptive account of subsequent events, and not the rule 
nor any OIRA documents that might be discoverable.68 Rather, the materials 
advise, ‘Pull up the Federal Register now and read the agency’s explanation. 
. . . ’69 The implicit lesson is that these materials are secondary, not important 
enough for inclusion in what students are required to read. The same contrast 
recurs throughout the book.
A chapter on “The Courts,” and Part II (“Statutory Interpretation”) cover 
familiar territory and cover it as imaginatively and well as one would expect 
from these authors. These are the pages, along with the prior treatment of 
Congress, that could excuse a law school from continuing to off er legislation as 
66. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
67. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
68. In my experience, DOT has been much more assiduous than most other agencies to include 
OIRA documents in its rulemaking dockets on the Federal Data Management Service, as 
the executive orders direct, and apparently it did so here. The blog account on which the 
authors rely in their description states, as they do not,
  A red-lined version of the fi nal rule showing all the changes that had been made to 
the draft while it was under OIRA review confi rms that this exemption was added during 
OIRA’s review process. What’s more, the red-lined version shows that OIRA directed the 
FAA to include new language in the rule’s preamble justifying this change solely on the basis 
of cost-benefi t analysis, with clear disregard for applicable law and relevant science.
  James Goodwin, Spurred On by Industry, OIRA Weakens Rule to Prevent Fatigue-Related Aviation 
Catastrophes, CPR BLOG (May 30, 2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.
cfm?idBlog=9CA2427E-B023-E297-6E9CA1731AF03E99. How much more evocative of the 
agency experience this problem would have been had this version been included in it . . . or 
even given as a “pull up,” with a reference to where it could be found.
69.  HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 57, at 220.
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an upperclass elective if it off ered the course these authors imagine in the fi rst 
year. For many of the cases, the authors do what, on the whole, materials on 
statutory interpretation do not—set out the statutory portions at issue in front 
of the case in which they are construed. This is a welcome advance, yet one 
yearns for a further step. Students would be likelier to do some independent 
reading if those portions were attended with a problem that could lead them 
to the issues the court would have to resolve, as well as a precis of any materials 
a lawyer would have in hand when presented with it. That could not prevent 
students from looking ahead to see “if the butler did it,” but if they were able 
to reach problems at the end of one class and opinions at the beginning of 
the next, students might quickly come to appreciate the diffi  culties lawyers 
face in reading statutes for their clients and to develop for themselves the 
essential skill of seeing a statute as others might, and not just as they initially 
do. Something like this does sometimes happen. The fi nal problem of “The 
Courts” follows a considerable work-up of cases on Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act and pregnancy discrimination, and Congress’s consequent enactment 
of a pregnancy discrimination act. How, now, should the EEOC approach 
accommodation of breast-feeding, or workplace rules controlling exposure of 
lactating or pregnant workers to toxic substances?
Part III (“Agencies and Administrative Implementation”) is less successful, 
in my judgment, though readers might think the author of widely used teaching 
materials on administrative law a biased observer. Since agency rulemaking is 
the agency equivalent of statutory formation and has already been met several 
times in the context of presidential-OIRA relations, one might imagine it 
would receive close attention, but its treatment is summary indeed. The 
governing section of the APA70 and Executive Order 12,866—the latter already 
several times described but not seen—are not set out. Students never see the 
documents of a rulemaking, either proposal or resulting rule; the only judicial 
opinions provided as primary material (that is, rather than summarized in text) 
concern substantive judicial review of rules, and the unspoken tension between 
those opinions and the APA’s text is not addressed. Respecting the Executive 
Order, students are given a Bush administration OMB circular describing the 
process and are asked to evaluate its application to a rulemaking on prison 
rape elimination; the authors provide a citation to where the regulatory impact 
analysis might be found, but the text only summarizes the rule and the cost-
benefi t issues that might have been considered. Perhaps the skeletal nature 
of this presentation was intended as an accommodation to the continuation, 
in this course’s wake, of administrative law courses that must be left with 
something to do. But in terms of providing a basis for understanding the 
rulemaking process, including the Executive Order interactions, it falls well 
short.
Although APA adjudication procedures are given only a paragraph’s 
summary, the adjudication materials contain a well-developed series of materials 
drawing on the FCC’s dispute with Fox Television Stations (and others) over 
70. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
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the airing of indecent material. First, one encounters the FCC’s decision71—
one of only two administrative decision documents I found reproduced in 
the book72—with good questions how it might have been understood and 
applied; then, excerpts from the two Supreme Court decisions resulting from 
the ensuing litigation;73 and fi nally, a request to advise the (new) Commission 
what if any room it has to act, and what its procedural options are for doing so. 
Engaging bundles like this, requiring students to act in awareness of political 
as well as legal constraints and without complete guidance from judicially 
developed doctrine, well fi t “The Legal Process” heritage and can distinguish 
a course of this character from the ordinary law school fare. One simply wishes 
there were more of them. 
One cannot leave these materials without understanding, as the authors 
insist, that “the doctrines of statutory law and administration are the bread 
and butter of modern lawyers, and most of the time the modern regulatory 
state is far ahead of the courts.”74 In this sense, Langdell has been overcome, 
and perhaps the most important purpose of a contemporary introductory 
public law course well-satisfi ed. If, as will be obvious, my preference remains 
with the Bressman-Rubin-Stack materials about to be discussed, it is because of 
the extent to which those materials require students to confront and use the 
actual materials of the administrative state (that is, statutes, regulations, Federal 
Register notices, and executive orders), reduce the domination of  judicial 
opinion, and introduce students to the economic, scientifi c, psychological, 
and political considerations underpinning the contemporary debates about 
rulemaking and its White House control.
4.  Lisa Bressman, Edward Rubin & Kevin Stack, The Regulatory State75
Readers understanding the general editorial of these pages—a preference 
for materials that often give students a diff erent experience than looking 
over the shoulders of courts—will readily understand why these became my 
preferred teaching materials for a regulatory state course once they were 
published. In my judgment they exemplify, fi nally, the escape from Langdell 
into the other legal worlds that mark today’s public law practice environment. 
Reading a statute or a regulation or other congressional or agency materials 
without an accompanying case is a common requirement in these materials, 
as it is in practice. The materials thoroughly introduce Congress and agencies 
as functioning institutions, and take the trouble to walk students through the 
71. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 57, at 780.
72. The other, the last reading in the course, is Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the Internal Revenue 
Service’s response to United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, 
supra note 57, at 1009.
73. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) and FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012).
74. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 57, at 780.
75. LISA BRESSMAN, EDWARD RUBIN & KEVIN STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE (2d ed. 2013).
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conventional elements of statutes, rules and Federal Register  notices—making 
clear that, just like opinions, these are documents whose working parts a 
lawyer needs to know. It is not all, or even chiefl y, about judicial opinions and 
doctrine, about the world as seen through judicial eyes.
The fi rst actor considered in these materials is the administrative agency, 
not Congress, and the fi rst relationships explored are those internal to 
the executive branch—the constitutional and the political issues around 
independence and presidential control. Students will (properly) leave the 
chapter understanding that the “independence” of independent regulatory 
commissions is an interesting characteristic, but one whose infl uence over 
agency behaviors may be marginal.76 The independents, too, are within the 
President’s orbit; tables of organization look much the same, and removals 
can come at a political price.
A chapter on “The Common Law as a Regulatory Regime,” like the materials 
in Heinzerling-Tushnet, then invites consideration of the limitations of tort law 
and the justifi cations for regulation—the fi rst in the context of automobile 
safety, setting what will be the materials’ pervasive concern, and the second 
with consideration of the economic and social justifi cations for regulation, 
presented with considerable compression and without quite the same level of 
normative loading as one fi nds in the other book. “Airbags 101” lays a factual 
grounding for later problems—requires, then, decision-making that should 
make plain to students attentive to their own mental processes the need for 
and frequent diffi  culty of judgment in relation to technology—and opens a 
brief discussion of the human problems of judgment under uncertainty.
After a standard description of the legislative process and brief attention 
to academic theories respecting its operation, Chapter 3 turns to automobile 
safety legislation—fi rst encapsulating the history of the National Traffi  c and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and relating it to these theories, and then 
requiring students to read the whole Act, unedited. Students will not have to 
read a case applying or interpreting this act for hundreds of pages. Rather, 
they are invited to create an outline of the statute’s structure; then to read 
lengthy excerpts from a Senate Report accompanying the bill that led to its 
enactment; then to consider the Report’s aid in understanding the statute 
itself; and then to consider the typical structure of a modern statute in relation 
to it. The lesson is reinforced by having them read excerpts from fi ve other 
statutes of varying ages, and relate them also to statutory structure. In relation 
to opinions, this is elementary stuff  that students learn to do from the fi rst day 
of law school. Must they not also learn it in relation to statutes, which they 
will often be encountering in their practice in just such a way? From this point, 
the chapter proceeds to a brief (caseless) discussion of delegation issues, and 
the basic steps and political realities of legislative drafting. Only then is there 
a chapter on “Statutory Interpretation by Courts” that, in the usual way, and 
largely by attention to cases, introduces the diffi  culties and tensions with a 
76. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 
COLUM.L.REV. 573 (1984).
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case (Holy Trinity)77 before taking students through fi rst the tools and then the 
theories of interpretation. As in so many casebooks on the subject, students do 
not come to the interpretive scene in each of these cases until after the court 
has ruled, and then with only so much of the statutory framework as they can 
fi nd in the court’s opinion. Opportunities for using the tools being taught 
come in the notes. 
“Statutory Implementation by Agencies,” the next chapter, begins by briefl y 
describing both the APA rulemaking process (the executive order procedures 
are not yet mentioned here; the development of the air bag standard largely 
preceded them) and the back-and-forth about air bag requirements that 
preceded the Reagan administration rule rescinding the passive-restraint 
requirement. Its fi rst large task is to ask students to do for the documents of 
rulemaking what they have already done for the NTMVSA—read fi rst the Federal 
Register notice of proposed rulemaking and then the Federal Register  publication 
of the adopted rule,78 outlining their various parts, considering their reasoning, 
and inviting the submission of “comments” should students fi nd unaddressed 
matters that ought to be considered. They will not fi nd judicial consideration 
of these matters until they have read another 323 pages; like the lawyers in that 
ultimate case, they are on their own, aided by questions invoking particular 
strands of possible analysis. The next primary reading is another fi nal rule 
as published in the Federal Register (that is, together with its statement of basis 
and purpose), this one from the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
permitting further questions about the forms of analysis used. Succeeding 
questions address issues of agency statutory analysis, providing Chevron79 (the 
only case the student will encounter in the chapter) alongside a healthy dose 
of Jerry Mashaw’s scholarship on the diff erences between judicial and agency 
statutory interpretation; scientifi c analysis; economic analysis; and political 
analysis. In each setting agency documents provide illustrations of discussions 
that are developed largely by well-chosen excerpts from the literature. It is, 
then, a chapter in which the student is constantly inside the agency or dealing 
with it, living with its documents and concerns (including the political “help” 
to be had as its work is done), and, for the moment, oblivious to the courts.
The fi nal chapter (“Control of Agency Action”) begins with the President 
and Congress—introducing at last Executive Order 12,866 (which, typically, 
is set out to be read before notes and questions about its structure and 
functioning). It then calls attention to oversight hearings and the questions of 
executive privilege that occasionally arise in resisting them, before returning 
to notable “separation of powers” decisions limiting Congress’s role, and 
then, fi nally, to “Judicial Control of Agency Action.” This part well covers the 
material an administrative law class would treat in considering standards and 
availability of judicial review; but no student will think that teaching judicial 
77. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
78. Federal Register notices, throughout, are published in Federal Register format, as if photocopied—
adding perhaps to the reality of the encounter.
79. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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doctrine is the central ambition of this course. It is an introduction to lawyers’ 
roles in the regulatory state, an introduction in which judicial decision plays 
a decidedly subsidiary role. The contrast with Manning-Stephenson, with its 
Langdellian roots, could hardly be stronger.
The very last section (a “case study” in control) presents a chronological 
set of materials associated with the development of the air bags standard, for 
which the ground was laid by “Airbags 101,” from its inception through the 
immediate aftermath of Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm 
Mutual Ins. Co.80 As usual, most the documents here concern actions by the 
agency, the White House or Congress, including transcripts of remarkable 
White House tapes from the Nixon administration. The one exception is 
Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transportation,81 a 1972 Sixth Circuit decision. That decision 
found fault with the “objectivity” of the dummies with which compliance with 
the passive-restraint requirements of Standard 208 were to be tested (and 
with the accommodation to their limits NHTSA had proposed), but left in 
place an ignition interlock requirement NHTSA had intended as an interim 
measure only.82 The political fi restorm resulting from consumer resentment of 
the interlocks, as Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst have so well recounted,83 
produced statutory changes that delayed passive-restraint requirements for 
two decades, at the cost of tens of thousands of avoidable highway deaths.
The authors of this book are an estimable and complementary set of 
scholars. Lisa Bressman’s recent work has contributed remarkably to our 
empirical understandings both of White House-agency relationships84 and 
the contemporary realities of statute-making in the Congress. Edward Rubin’s 
grounding in political science and philosophy, and understanding of the 
defi ciencies of Langdellian methodology,85 bring with them an astounding 
breadth of view about what administrative law might be. Kevin Stack, the 
youngest of the three, has contributed importantly to the understanding of 
80. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
81. 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
82. 472 F.2d, at 675. I have had students read the case when they read the Act. I do so to 
sensitize them to the importance of identifying possible meanings of statutory words they 
instinctively believe they have understood just by reading them. In one class they must 
consider whether the “objective criteria” of Section 102(2) and “objective terms” of Section 
103(a) are required for testing mechanisms as well as the safety equipment itself, and the 
information they would want to have to advise Chrysler on this question. Then they get 
to read the opinion, questionably fi nding in the affi  rmative, with little more to support the 
result than the court’s understanding of “objective.” 
83. See MASHAW & HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTOMOBILE SAFETY, supra note 4.
84. Lisa Bressman & Michael Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice 
of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2006).
85. See Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 
609 (2007). Rubin accepted the deanship of Vanderbilt Law School on the understanding, 
inter alia, that he could build this course as a fi rst-year requirement.
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old chestnuts86 and contemporary puzzles87 and, as remarked at the outset, 
has redirected our attention to what was lost when administrative law turned 
Langdellian, turned to a study of courts and doctrine.88 The authors have 
produced an eff ective antidote. 
Conclusion
The contributions of Jerry Mashaw, William Eskridge and other Yale 
instructors to our understanding of the real world of law notwithstanding, 
the curriculum at Yale remains essentially what it was when I became its 
student 54 years ago—and long before that. Courses in professional ethics, and 
requirements to take skills courses and to complete two substantial writing 
requirements, have been added subsequently, but not a course requiring 
understanding of the real world of today’s law. Perhaps Yale’s students, 
brilliant as they are, are not misled by the endurance of Langdell’s curriculum 
well past its senescence. Yet one might still think that the deepest recognition 
of Professor Mashaw’s remarkable contributions to our understanding 
of that real world, its history and its operation today, will come when Yale 
joins the many law schools now requiring their students to take a course on 
legislation and regulation in their fi rst year—if, of course, it is taught outside 
the Langdellian model.
86. See Kevin Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007).
87. See Kevin Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012).
88. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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